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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Case No. 20020478-CA 
vs. 
MARC W. SCHUMACHER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
5th DISTRICT 
HON. J. PHILIP EVES, JUDGE 
Marc W. Schumacher 
PO Box 287 
1782 East 2900 North 
Paragonah, UT 84760 
435-559-7172 
Paul Bittmenn 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 421 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Appellant, pro se 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Marc William Schumacher, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
it< A ^ t O 
lhah Court of Appeals 
JUL ! 2 z;.v 
Pauletie Stagg 
Cierk of the C&urt 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020478-CA 
This case is before the court on the State's motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to rule 10(a)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. The State did not cite any legal 
authority or file a memorandum of law in support of the motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's motion for summary 
disposition is denied and deferred pending plenary presentation 
and consideration of the appeal. 
DATED t h i s 
^«JfiTTHfe COURT n day of July, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on July 12, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
97 N MAIN STE 1 
CEDAR CITY UT 84720 
MARC W. SCHUMACHER 
PO BOX 257 
PARAGONAH UT 847 60 
Dated this July 12, 2002. 
AAJ^J^T) By/2: 
De^putxf C l e r k 
Caste No. 20020478 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under UCA Section 78-2a-3 and Rule 5, 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress was denied in the trial 
court. As part of the Defendant/Appellant's plea, the issue of the validity of 
the stop by the police officer has been preserved for appeal and is now 
taken. 
ISSUE 
Can a police officer, who hears about a vehicle running a stop sign 
but does not personally observe it, legally stop that vehicle and conduct an 
investigation without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity? 
Appellant answers: "NO" 
Appellee answers: "YES" 
The standard of review is correctness. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are determi-
native of the issue presented for appeal in this cause: 
AMENDMENT IV, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 14, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
UCA Section 77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he 
has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with "DIM" and "Open Container" in the 
Iron County Circuit Court. The evidence available to the State to support 
prosecution was discovered as a result of a traffic stop and subsequent 
investigation and search of the vehicle. Appellant claims the stop was 
unconstitutional and all evidence gathered therefrom should be excluded. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied on 
November 29, 2001. On April 29, 2002, Appellant pled "no contest" to the 
DUI with the right to appeal the legality of the stop. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Brent Dunlap, an undercover Narcotics Task Force Officer working in 
his own vehicle (T. page 17, lines 1-6), responded to a radio communication 
from Dispatch which received a call reporting "suspicious activity" in a 
parking lot involving an older green pick-up truck. Agent Dunlap saw 
Appellant in the parking lot in front of his green truck with the truck's hood 
up. The officer observed Appellant close the hood and get into his truck. 
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Agent Dunlap testified that there was nothing suspicious or unusual about 
Appellant's behavior (T. page 18, lines 16-21). 
Appellant then drove out of the parking lot at an unknown rate of 
speed with Agent Dunlap in his unmarked vehicle following. There was no 
testimony that Appellant was speeding; according to the Officer: "I wasn't 
able to get a good pace on him" (T. page 19, line 19). 
As Appellant approached a stop sign at the corner of Sage Drive and 
600 South "...the vehicle did slow down but it failed to make a complete 
stop at the stop sign." (T. page 19, line 20). 
The Appellant continued eastbound on 600 South for approximately 
one mile where he was pulled over and arrested by a different officer; 
Officer Mike Russell, of the Cedar City Police Department. 
The arresting officer, Mike Russell, testified that he did not observe 
the failure to stop at the sign (T. page 8, lines 22-25) yet he is the one who 
stopped Appellant's vehicle. He testified that he was the one who stopped 
the Appellant and he made the stop because he heard over the radio that a 
green pick-up truck had run a stop sign (T. page 9, lines 1-4). After he 
stopped Appellant and conducted an investigation, Officer Russell issued a 
citation for DUI and "open container". 
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There was no testimony from either officer that Appellant was 
weaving, driving erratically, or even driving at an excessive speed. 
There was no testimony of any suspicious activity. There was no testimony 
of any suspected criminal activity. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only testimony elicited from either officer which would give rise 
to the issuance of any citation was the failure to come to a complete stop. 
An officer may not stop a vehicle for a traffic violation unless he 
personally witnessed that violation. Absent a personal observation of a 
traffic violation, a vehicle may not be stopped unless there is "reasonable 
suspicion" of criminal activity. 
Here, Officer Russell did not witness the failure to stop at the stop 
sign and there was no suspicion at all, let alone "reasonable suspicion", of 
criminal activity. 
Consequently, the stop was a 4 th Amendment violation and the 
evidence gathered therefrom must be excluded. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
A brief stop of a citizen by a law enforcement officer, even though 
the detention is brief and the purpose merely investigatory, to be lawful, 
requires that the officer have "specific, articulable facts" that reasonably 
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warrant suspicion that a crime has occurred or is being committed; United 
States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 US 873 (1975). 
This "reasonable suspicion" standard is ground in the Fourth 
Amendment, Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 14, 
Constitution of Utah: State v. Trujillo, Utah, 739 P. 2nd 85; and, State v. 
Mendenhall, 446 US 544, (1980). Brief, public, and investigatory stops, 
which fall short of traditional arrest, are governed by this standard: Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968). No distinction in such an investigatory stop is 
made between that of a pedestrian and the stop of a vehicle: Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 US 649 (1979); and, State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2nd 972 (Utah 
App.1988); State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2nd 880 (Utah App. 1990); State v. 
Talbot, 792 P. 2nd 489 (Utah App. 1990); and, State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2nd 
1127 (Utah 1994). 
Recently, the 10th Federal Circuit Court reiterated the rule that the 
constitutionally mandated prerequisite for investigative detention is a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: Oliver v. Woods, 209 F. 3rd 1179 
(10th Circuit, 2000). 
The trial Court agreed with the State's argument that there was in 
fact "reasonable suspicion" for the stop because the informant who observ-
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ed the failure to stop was a member of a drug task force operation and was 
thus "reliable/' The informant's reliability is immaterial inasmuch as the 
case law cited by the State applies only to crimes - specifically each 
and every case cited by Respondent involves felonies. The standard for the 
stop of a felony is entirely different from the standard required for the stop 
of someone who has been observed doing something that does not even 
rise to a misdemeanor. Each and every applicable Utah case states that a 
stop for a non-criminal traffic infraction is justified only if the officer 
personally observed the traffic violation: State v. Hansen, 17 P, 3rd 1135 
(Utah App. (2000); Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P. 2nd 1011 (Utah App. 
1989); Lopez, supra; Talbot, supra; Sierra, supra; and Marshall, supra. 
In addition to the felony case law, the trial court relied on Utah 
Criminal Code 77-7-15 to support its decision. However, Utah Criminal 
Code section 77-7-15 does not apply to running a stop sign (the informant's 
only observed infraction, according to the testimony); it applies only to 
criminal infractions. 
There is not a single Utah case which even suggests that the 
procedures and rules promulgated in Chapter 7, specifically 77-7-15 
apply to non-criminal infractions. On the contrary, each and every case 
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interpreting this law indicates that it aplies only to crimes: 
The reasonable, articulable suspicion contemplated 
in this section (77-7-15) must be based on objective 
facts suggesting the individual may be involved in 
criminal activity." State v. Menke, 787 P. 2nd 537 (1990). 
In order to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion 
to justify stopping defendant an officer must be able to 
articulate some unlawful or suspicious behavior connecting 
the detainee to the suspected criminal activity. State v. 
Potter, 863 P. 2nd 40 (1993). 
See also: Sierra, supra. 
The language of 77-7-15 uses the term "a public offense". This 
terminology can only mean criminal activity, to wit: 
While standing on Main Street waiting for a parade, an officer 
hears a man make an off-color joke in a normal voice but loud 
enough that women and youngsters could hear it. Someone 
may be offended by the joke, and it was made on a public street. 
The man leaves and gets into a older green truck. The officer, 
being from another jurisdiction or otherwise unable or unwilling to 
act, telephones the local police describing the truck. The police 
send a cruiser in pursuit. 
Clearly the cruiser would not be able to constitutionally stop the 
truck. The driver committed a "public offense" but he did not commit a 
crime. 
If the term "public offense" in 77-7-15 was interpreted literally and 
construed to mean any behavior which someone might deem offensive, 
save for criminal behavior, the language is overly broad and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Simply put, there was nothing for the Arresting officer to investigate 
he did not witness the traffic violation and he had no suspicion of any 
criminal activity. Without something to investigate, his stop, investigation 
and search were illegal and the fruits therefrom should be excluded. 
Consequently, the Appelle prays for an ordersupressing all evidence 
gathered from the illegal search and dismissal of the charges of "D i l l " and 
"Open Container". 
^spectfully^u^mitted, 
MARC W. SpHUMACHER 
P. 0. BOX 267 
1752 East 2900 North 
Paragonah, Utah 84760 
435-559-7172 
Acknowledgment of Service: 
On August 23, 2002, I received a copy of Appellant's Appeal Brief on 
behalf of the attorney whose name and address ap^ai) below> 
Signature: 
Name: 
Paul Bittmenn, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Box 428 
97 North Main Street - Suite #1 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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ADDENDUM 
10 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UT ^ ILED 
STATE 
MARC 
OF UTAH 
VS 
WILLIAM 
r ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
SCHUMACHER. ) 
Defendant. ) 
FEB 2 0 2002 
5th DISTRICT COURT, 
IRON COW— 
DEPUTY CLERK. 
CASE NO. 015501427 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
P.O. Box 608 
Parowan, Utah 84761 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
OCTOBER 29, 2001 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan 
COPY 
BY MR. BITTMENN: 
Q Okay. So you were around Cedar High? 
A Correct. I was westbound on 600 South towards Cinema 
8. 
Q And what drew your attention to the defendant's 
vehicle? 
A Two things. One was the radio transmission from Agent 
Dunlap, who was behind the suspect vehicle giving me reports on 
direction of travel, that type of thing. The second thing was 
the truck matched the description that the dispatch had given 
out. 
Q Okay. Is there a stop sign on any corner around there? 
A Not on — not by Cedar High School, no. 
Q Did you see him run the stop sign? 
A I did not. 
Q You didn't see him run the stop sign? 
A I did not. 
Q Okay. How about 600 South and Sage Drive; did he run a 
stop sign there? 
A According to Agent Dunlap's testimony, he would testify 
to that. 
Q Okay. So you didn't see him run a stop sign? 
A I did not. That was information from Agent Dunlap. 
Q Did you pull him over? 
A I did. 
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Q Was it communicated to you that he had run a stop sign? 
A It was. 
Q How? 
A By radio transmission. 
Q Okay. And — excuse me — when you saw him, did you 
turn your — were you in a police cruiser? 
A I was. 
Q And did you turn your lights and sirens on? 
A I did. I made a U-turn on 600 South to follow the 
vehicle and initiated the stop. I turned on my overhead 
lights. 
Q Okay. How far did you have to follow him? 
A We had just passed Cedar High School. I believe Mr. 
Schumacher did not pull his vehicle over until pretty much the 
stop sign at 300 West 600 South. I don't know how far that 
would be. 
Q Okay. 
A Maybe a couple hundred yards. 
Q So, not very far? 
A No. 
Q Did you make contact with Mr. Schumacher? 
A I did at that time. 
Q Was he driving? 
A He was. 
Q How did you contact him, driver's side or passenger 
A It's a Ford F250 extended cab, or heavy duty F250 
four-wheel drive, undercover, unmarked. 
Q You are an undercover agent for the task force, aren't 
you? 
A Yes. I'm currently assigned to the Southern Utah 
Regional Office through the State Bureau of Investigations. 
Q So wherever you go, you are in your vehicle? 
A Basically, yes. I'm on-call 24 hours a day. 
Basically, I'm in the vehicle most of the time. 
Q Okay. Do you remember seeing the defendant in his 
vehicle on that date? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Where was that? 
A First I noticed the vehicle is in the Cinema 8 
Theater's parking lot. Dispatch had just put out an attempt to 
locate on a suspicious vehicle at, inside the parking lot at 
the Cinema 8 Theaters. The information we received is a person 
called in, stating that the truck had been there — an older 
green pickup truck — 
DEFENDANT SCHUMACHER: Objection, Your Honor. This is 
an area that's gone beyond the scope of the question. The 
question was, when did you first observe the defendant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. BITTMENN: 
Q Okay. So you saw him at the Cinema 8, right? 
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A Correct. 
Q Okay. Why were you at Cinema 8? 
A Cedar Dispatch put out an attempt to locate on a 
suspicious person sitting in an older green pickup. The 
reporting party informed Cedar Dispatch that the truck had been 
there since approximately 3 p.m. And it was shortly after 
9 p.m. at the time of the phone call. 
Q Okay. And how far away were you when you got the call 
over dispatch? 
A I was taking exit 57, the northbound off ramp which is 
on the south end of Cedar City. 
Q So you were right there? 
A Yeah, within a mile or two. 
Q And when you got to the Cinema 8 Theaters, what did you 
see? 
A I entered the parking lot on the south end, drove 
through the parking lot. Mr. Schumacher's vehicle was the only 
older green pickup I saw. It was over in the northwest area of 
the parking lot at the time. His hood was up. And there was 
another car parked next to him. 
Q Okay. Anything unusual there? 
A No. 
Q Okay. What drew your attention to him? 
A It was the only older green pickup in the parking lot. 
Q Okay. Could you observe him for a while? 
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A As I was pulling through the parking lot, I saw he was 
just shutting the hood of his vehicle. He entered his vehicle 
and drove out of the parking lot. As he was exiting the 
parking lot, he spun his tires a little bit, came out onto Sage 
Drive headed northbound. 
Q Which road is sage Drive? 
A Pardon? 
Q Which road is Sage Drive? 
A It's the one on the east side of the theaters but on 
the west side of 1-15. It goes between the theaters and 1-15 
itself. Be the west side frontage road, basically. 
Q Okay. So he spun his tires. He started going which 
way? 
A Northbound. 
Q On Sage Drive? 
A On Sage Drive. 
Q Okay. 
A It appeared that he increased his speed. I wasn't able 
to get a good pace on him. As we approached the intersection 
of 600 South Sage Drive, the vehicle did slow down, but it 
failed to make a complete stop at the stop sign. 
Q Is that the one up on the hill? 
A Correct. 
Q So he didn't make a stop? 
A Correct. 
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